【转】Google Official Blog : Testimony : The Internet in China(谷歌官方博客:听证会证词:中国的互联网)

更多有关于 “ Google ” 的文章,请点击这里
Google Official Blog : Testimony : The Internet in China
Google Official Blog : Testimony : The Internet in China

Testimony : The Internet in China

February 15, 2006

Posted by Karen Wickre, Google Blog team


2006 年 2 月 15 日

发布者:谷歌博客团队 Karen Wickre

At today’s hearing before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, we provided the following testimony:


Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations

Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives
February 15, 2006
Elliot Schrage
Vice President, Global Communications
and Public Affairs, Google Inc.

2006 年 2 月 15 日

My name is Elliot Schrage and I am the vice president for global communications and public affairs at Google. My role is to help shape and explain the decisions Google makes as a company in its efforts to provide global access to information as quickly, conveniently, usefully, and comprehensively as possible.

我的名字是艾略特施拉格,我是 Google 的全球传播和公共事务副总裁。我的职责是帮助塑造和解释 Google 作为一家公司所做的决策,努力让谷歌尽可能快速、方便、有效和全面地提供全球信息访问。

I’m here today to answer any and all questions you might have about how we are attempting to do business in China. I certainly don’t – my colleagues certainly don’t – expect everyone to agree with our decision to launch a new service inside this challenging, complex, promising market. I hope my testimony will help explain how we came to our decision, what we’re seeking to accomplish, and how we’re seeking to accomplish it.

我今天在这里回答您关于我们如何在中国开展业务的任何问题。我当然不会 – 我的同事肯定不会 – 期望每个人都同意我们在这个充满挑战、复杂和希望的市场中推出新服务的决定。我希望我的证词将有助于解释我们如何做出决定、我们想要实现的目标、以及我们如何实现这一目标。


At the outset, I want to acknowledge what I hope is obvious: Figuring out how to deal with China has been a difficult exercise for Google. The requirements of doing business in China include self-censorship – something that runs counter to Google’s most basic values and commitments as a company. Despite that, we made a decision to launch a new product for China – Google.cn – that respects the content restrictions imposed by Chinese laws and regulations. Understandably, many are puzzled or upset by our decision. But our decision was based on a judgment that Google.cn will make a meaningful – though imperfect – contribution to the overall expansion of access to information in China.


首先,我想承认我希望的(事情)是显而易见的:弄清楚如何应对中国对谷歌来说是一项艰难的工作。在中国开展业务的要求包括自我审查 – 这与谷歌最基本的价值观和公司承诺背道而驰。尽管如此,我们还是决定为中国推出一款新产品 — Google.cn — 尊重中国法律法规规定的内容限制。可以理解的是,许多人对我们的决定感到困惑或不安。但我们的决定是基于一项判断,即 Google.cn 将对中国信息获取的整体发展做出有意义的贡献 – 尽管不完美。

Until a few weeks ago, Google has been serving Chinese Internet users the same way we serve all Internet users worldwide since the company was founded in 1999. Though we had no operations or employees in China, we were able to provide a Chinese-language version of Google.com that, thanks to the global nature of the Internet, could easily be reached by users inside China. In 2002, we started to learn that Google was sporadically unavailable to Chinese users. In the fall of that year, we awoke one morning to emails from Google users in China informing us that our service was completely unavailable. We faced a choice at that point: hold fast to our commitment to free speech (and risk a long-term cut-off from our Chinese users), or compromise our principles by entering the Chinese market directly and subjecting ourselves to Chinese laws and regulations. We stood by our principles, which turned out to be a good choice, as access to Google.com was largely restored within about two weeks.

直到几周前,自从公司成立于 1999 年以来,谷歌一直为中国互联网用户提供服务,就像我们为全球所有互联网用户提供服务一样。虽然我们在中国没有运营或员工,但我们能够提供中文版本的 Google.com ,由于互联网的全球性,中国境内的用户很容易就能看到它。2002 年,我们开始了解到中国用户偶尔无法使用谷歌。那年秋天,一天早上我们醒来,收到中国谷歌用户的电子邮件,告知我们我们的服务完全无法使用。我们在这一点上面临一个选择:坚持我们对言论自由的承诺(并冒着对中国用户长期停止服务的风险),或直接进入中国市场并遵守中国法律法规来妥协我们的原则。我们遵循我们的原则(即坚持言论自由,但希望中国政府不屏蔽谷歌的服务),结果证明这是一个不错的选择,因为 Google.com 的访问在大约两周内基本恢复。

However, we soon discovered new problems. Many queries, especially politically sensitive queries, were not making it through to Google’s servers. And access became often slow and unreliable, meaning that our service in China was not something we felt proud of. Even though we weren’t doing any self-censorship, our results were being filtered anyway, and our service was being actively degraded on top of that. Indeed, at some times users were even being redirected to local Chinese search engines Nevertheless, we continued to offer our service from outside China while other Internet companies were entering China and building operations there.


A bit more than a year ago, we decided to take a serious look at China and re-assess whether our approach there was the best strategy. We spent a lot of time talking to Chinese Internet experts and users, scholars and academics inside and outside China, respected “China hands,” human rights groups and activists, government officials, business leaders, as well as our own Chinese employees. From those discussions, we reached the conclusion that perhaps we had been taking the wrong path. Our search results were being filtered; our service was being crippled; our users were flocking to local Chinese alternatives; and, ultimately, Chinese Internet users had less access to information than they would have had.

一年多前,我们决定认真看待中国并重新评估我们的方法是否是最好的策略。我们花费了很多时间与中国互联网专家和用户、中国境内外的学者和大学教授交谈,尊重 “ 中国之手 ” ,(同时还包括)人权组织和活动家 、政府官员 、商界领袖 、以及我们自己的中国员工。从这些讨论中,我们得出结论,也许我们走错了路。我们的搜索结果正在被过滤;我们的服务正在被削弱;我们的用户纷纷涌向当地的中国替代品;最终,中国互联网用户获取信息的机会比他们原来的要少。

Let me dig a bit deeper into the analytic framework we developed for China. Google’s objective is to make the world’s information accessible to everyone, everywhere, all the time. It is a mission that expresses two fundamental commitments:

让我更深入地探讨一下我们为中国制作的分析框架。Google 的目标是让所有人无论何时何地都能访问世界的信息。这是一项表达了两项基本承诺的使命:

(a) First, our business commitment to satisfy the interests of users, and by doing so to build a leading company in a highly competitive industry; and

(b) Second, our policy conviction that expanding access to information to anyone who wants it will make our world a better, more informed, and freer place.



Some governments impose restrictions that make our mission difficult to achieve, and this is what we have encountered in China. In such a situation, we have to add to the balance a third fundamental commitment:

(c) Be responsive to local conditions.



So with that framework in mind, we decided to try a different path, a path rooted in the very pragmatic calculation that we could provide more access to more information to more Chinese citizens more reliably by offering a new service – Google.cn – that, though subject to Chinese self-censorship requirements, would have some significant advantages. Above all, it would be faster and more reliable, and would provide more and better search results for all but a handful of politically sensitive subjects. We also developed several elements that distinguish our service in China, including:

所以考虑到这个框架,我们决定换一条不同的道路,这条道路根植于非常务实的考虑中,我们可以通过提供新的服务 – Google.cn – 更可靠地为更多的中国公民提供更多的信息,虽然受到中国自我审查的要求,但会有一些显著的优势。最重要的是它会更快、更可靠,并且会为除了少数(关注)政治敏感话题之外的所有人提供更多更好的搜索结果。我们还实现了(以下)几点,用于区分我们在中国的服务,包括:

  • Disclosure to users — We will give notification to Chinese users whenever search results have been removed.
  • Protection of user privacy — We will not maintain on Chinese soil any services, like email, that involve personal or confidential data. This means that we will not, for example, host Gmail or Blogger, our email and blogging tools, in China.
  • Continued availability of Google.com — We will not terminate the availability of our unfiltered Chinese-language Google.com service.

Many, if not most, of you here know that one of Google’s corporate mantras is “Don’t be evil.” Some of our critics – and even a few of our friends – think that phrase arrogant, or naïve or both. It’s not. It’s an admonition that reminds us to consider the moral and ethical implications of every single business decision we make.

  • 向用户披露 – 我们会在删除搜索结果时通知中国用户。
  • 保护用户隐私 – 我们不会在中国境内维护涉及个人或机密数据的任何服务,如电子邮件。这意味着我们不会在中国托管 Gmail 或 Blogger ,我们的电子邮件和博客。
  • Google.com 的持续可用性 – 我们不会终止我们未经过滤的中文 Google.com 服务的可用性。

你们中的许多人(而不是大多数人)都知道谷歌的企业口号之一就是 “ 不要做坏事。” 我们的一些批评者 – 甚至我们的一些朋友 – 都认为这句话是傲慢的、或天真的、或两者兼而有之。不是。这是一个警告,提醒我们在做出每一个商业决策之前都要考虑对道德和伦理的影响。

We believe that our current approach to China is consistent with this mantra. Our hope is that our mix of measures, though far from our ideal, would accomplish more for Chinese citizens’ access to information than the alternative. We don’t pretend that this is the single “right” answer to the dilemma faced by information companies in China, but rather a reasonable approach that seems likely to bring our users greater access to more information than any other search engine in China. And by serving our users better, we hope it will be good for our business, too, over the long run.

我们认为,我们目前对中国的做法与这一口号是一致的。我们希望,尽管远非(能够达到)我们的理想,但我们的措施组合将为中国公民获取信息提供更多的选择。我们并不假装这是解决在中国的信息公司所面临的困境的唯一 “ 正确 ” 答案,而是一种合理的方法,似乎可以让我们的用户获得比中国其他任何搜索引擎更多的信息。通过更好地服务我们的用户,我们希望从长远来看它对我们的业务也有好处。

To be clear, these are not easy, black-and-white issues. As our co-founder Sergey Brin has said, we understand and respect the perspective of people who disagree with our decision; indeed, we recognize that the opposing point of view is a reasonable one to hold. Nonetheless, in a situation where there are only imperfect options, we think we have made a reasonable choice. It’s a choice that has generated enormous attention – vastly more, indeed, than our earlier decisions not to cross the line of self-censorship. We hope that the ensuing dialogue will lead to productive collaboration among businesses and governments to further our shared aim of expanding access to information worldwide.

需要明确的是,这些并非易事,(这不是)黑和白的问题。正如我们的联合创始人谢尔盖布林所说,我们理解并尊重不同意我们决定的人的观点;事实上,我们认识到反对的观点是合理的观点。尽管如此,在只有不完美选择的情况下,我们认为我们做出了合理的选择。这是一个引起极大关注的选择 – 事实上,比我们早先不跨越自我审查的决定要多得多。我们希望随后的对话将促进企业和政府之间的富有成效的合作,以进一步实现我们扩大全球信息获取的共同目标。

We think we have made a reasonable decision, though we cannot be sure it will ultimately be proven to be the best one. With the announcement of our launch of Google.cn, we’ve begun a process that we hope will better serve our Chinese users. We also hope that we will be able to add new services, if circumstances permit. We are also aware that, for any number of reasons, this may not come to pass. Looking ahead, we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives I’ve outlined above, we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.

我们认为我们做出了一个合理的决定,尽管我们无法确定它最终会被证明是最好的。随着我们宣布推出 Google.cn ,我们已经启动了一个我们希望能更好地为中国用户服务的流程。如果情况许可,我们也希望能够增加新的服务。我们也知道,由于种种原因,这可能不会成为现实。展望未来,我们将密切关注中国的情况,包括新的法律和对我们服务的其他限制。如果我们确定我们无法实现上述目标,我们将毫不犹豫地重新考虑我们对待中国的策略。

In the remainder of my written testimony below, I set forth the situation in China as we see it, the debate over the options we confronted, the substance of what Google has decided to do there, the reasoning behind that decision, and some ideas for both industry and governmental actions that could make a useful contribution to the objective of expanding access to information in every corner of the globe.


The Big Picture: The Internet is Transforming China

The backdrop to Google’s decision to launch Google.cn is the explosive growth of the Internet in China. To put it simply, the Internet is transforming China for the better. And the weight of the evidence suggests that the Internet is accelerating and deepening these positive trends, even in an imperfect environment.


Google 决定推出 Google.cn 的背景是互联网在中国的爆炸式增长。简而言之,互联网正在改善中国。由重要的证据表明,即使在不完美的环境中,互联网正在加速并深化这些积极的趋势。

Viewed broadly, information and communication technology – including the Internet, email, instant messaging, web logs, bulletin boards, podcasts, peer-to-peer applications, streaming audio and video, mobile telephones, SMS text messages, MMS photo-sharing, and so on – has brought Chinese citizens a greater ability to read, discuss, publish and communicate about a wider range of topics, events, and issues than ever before.

广泛地看,信息和通信技术 – 包括互联网、电子邮件、即时消息、网络日志、公告板、播客、点对点应用程序、流媒体音频和视频、移动电话、短信和彩信照片共享等等 – 使中国公民比以往任何时候都更有能力阅读、讨论、发布和交流更广泛的主题、事件和问题。

There are currently more than 105 million Internet users in China.1 Nearly half of them have access to broadband connections – an increase of 41% since 2003.2 Even so, Internet deployment in China is at a very early stage, reaching only about 8% of the population.3 Among those under 24 years of age, more than 80% are Internet users.4 By 2010, China will have more than 250 million Internet users.5 And already, there are more than 350 million mobile phones, a number growing by roughly 57 million annually.6

目前中国有超过 1.05 亿互联网用户。其中近一半的人可以使用宽带连接 – 自 2003 年以来增长了 41 % 。即便如此,中国的互联网部署还处于初期阶段,仅占人口的 8 % 左右。在 24 岁以下的人中,超过 80 % 是互联网用户。到 2010 年,中国的互联网用户将超过 2.5 亿。已经有超过 3.5 亿部手机,每年增长约 5700 万部。

A recent and well-respected study by researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) documents some interesting, and perhaps surprising, findings about the views of Chinese Internet users:7

中国社会科学院( CASS )的研究人员最近做了一项备受推崇的研究,其中记录了一些有趣的、也许是令人惊讶的关于中国互联网用户观点的调查结果:

  • Most Chinese Internet users believe that the Internet is changing politics in China. Internet users tend to agree that it will increase political transparency and expand discourse: 63% believe that citizens will learn more about politics by going online, 54% of users believe the Internet provides more opportunities for criticizing the government, and 45% believe that the Internet provides more opportunities to express political views.
  • Large majorities of Chinese believe that certain kinds of Internet content, including pornography and violence, should be controlled. However, only 7.6% believe that political content on the Internet should be controlled.
  • By a 10:1 margin, Chinese Internet users believe that the Internet will make the world a better, rather than worse, place.

Based on its results, the CASS Internet Survey concludes that “the political impact of the Internet is more significant than it is in other countries. The impact can be seen not only in the relationship between government and citizens but also among people who share similar political interests. Thus, we can predict that as Internet becomes more popular in China, the impact on politics will be stronger.”8

  • 大多数中国互联网用户认为互联网正在改变中国的政治。互联网用户倾向于赞成互联网将提高政治的透明度并扩大话语(权):63 % 的公民认为通过上网可以了解更多政治,54 % 的用户认为互联网提供了更多批评政府的机会,45 % 的人认为互联网提供了更多表达政治观点的机会。
  • 大多数中国人认为应该控制某些类型的互联网内容,包括色情和暴力。但是,只有 7.6 % 的人认为应该控制互联网上的政治内容。
  • 中国互联网用户以 10 : 1 的比例认为,互联网将使世界变得更美好,而不是更糟糕。

根据这个(调查)结果,中国社会科学院互联网调查得出结论:“ 互联网对政治的影响比其他国家更为重要。这种影响不仅可以在政府与公民之间的关系中看到,也可以在具有相似政治诉求的人之间看到。因此,我们可以预测,随着互联网在中国越来越受欢迎,对政治的影响将越来越大。”

The Problem: Access to Google in China is Slow and Unreliable

Since 2000, Google has been offering a Chinese-language version of Google.com, designed to make Google just as easy, intuitive, and useful to Chinese-speaking users worldwide as it is for speakers of English. Within China, however, Google.com has proven to be both slow and unreliable. Indeed, Google’s users in China struggle with a service that is often unavailable. According to our measurements, Google.com appears to be unreachable around 10% of the time. Even when Chinese users can get to Google.com, the website is slow (sometimes painfully so, and nearly always slower than our local competitors), and sometimes produces results that, when clicked on, stall out the user’s browser. The net result is a bad user experience for those in China.


自 2000 年以来,谷歌一直在提供中文版的 Google.com ,旨在让全球华语用户在使用谷歌时更简单、直观、有用,就像英语使用者一样。然而,在中国,Google.com 已被证明既缓慢又不可靠。事实上,谷歌在中国的用户正在努力寻找通常无法获得的服务。根据我们的调查结果,Google.com 似乎在大约 10 % 的时间内无法访问。即使中国用户可以访问 Google.com ,网站也很慢(有时很痛苦,而且几乎总是比我们在当地的竞争对手慢),有时(甚至)会出现这些问题:在点击时,会使用户的浏览器停止运行。最终导致的结果是中国用户体验不佳。

The cause of the slowness and unreliability appears to be, in large measure, the extensive filtering performed by China’s licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs). China’s laws, regulations, and policies against illegal information apply not only to the Internet content providers, but also to the ISPs. China has nine licensed international gateway data carriers, and many hundreds of smaller local ISPs. Each ISP is legally obligated to implement its own filtering mechanisms, leading to diverse and sometimes inconsistent outcomes across the network at any given moment. For example, some of Google’s services appear to be unavailable to Chinese users nearly always, including Google News, the Google cache (i.e., our service that maintains stored copies of web pages), and Blogspot (the site that hosts weblogs of Blogger customers). Other services, such as Google Image Search, can be reached about half the time. Still others, such as Google.com, Froogle, and Google Maps, are unavailable only around 10% of the time.

缓慢和不可靠的原因似乎在很大程度上是由于中国许可的互联网服务提供商( ISP )在进行大规模的过滤。中国的法律、法规和反非法信息政策不仅适用于互联网内容提供商,也适用于 ISP 。中国拥有九家获得许可的国际网关数据运营商,以及数百家规模较小的本地 ISP 。每个 ISP 在法律上都有义务实施自己的过滤机制,在任何特定时刻都会导致网络中出现多种且有时不一致的结果。例如,Google 的一些服务似乎几乎无法供中国用户使用,包括 Google 新闻 、Google 缓存(即我们用于维护网页的存储副本的服务)和 Blogspot(托管客户博客的网站)。其他服务,例如 Google 图片搜索,大约有一半的时间是可用的。其他一些产品,例如 Google.com 、Froogle 和 Google 地图,只有大约 10 % 的时间是不可用的。

Even when Google is reachable, the data indicates that we are almost always slower than our local competitors. Third-party measurements of latency (meaning the delay that a user experiences when trying to download a web page) suggest that the average total time to download a Google webpage is more than seven times slower than for Baidu, the leading Chinese search engine.

即使谷歌可以访问,数据也表明我们几乎总是比我们在当地的竞争对手慢。第三方对延迟的调查(指的是用户在尝试下载网页时遇到的延迟)表明,下载 Google 网页的平均总时间比中国领先的搜索引擎百度慢 7 倍。

Users trying to get to Google will have different experiences at different times of day, and from different points on the Chinese network. For example, access to Google appears to be speedier and more reliable in Beijing than in Shanghai, and generally better in the largest cities compared to smaller towns, suburbs, and villages.

试图访问 Google 的用户将在一天的不同时间以及中国网络的不同节点上获得不同的体验。例如,北京的访问速度似乎比上海更快、更可靠,而且与较小的城镇、郊区和村庄相比,大城市的访问速度通常更好。

Based on our analysis of the available data, we believe that the filtering performed by the international gateway ISPs is far more disruptive to our services than that performed by smaller local ISPs. Because Google’s servers have, to date, been located exclusively outside China, all traffic to and from Google must traverse at least one of China’s international gateway ISPs. Accordingly, Google’s access problems can only be solved by creating a local presence inside China.

根据我们对可用数据的分析,我们认为国际网关 ISP 执行的过滤对我们的服务的破坏性要大于较小的本地 ISP 。由于谷歌的服务器迄今为止仅位于中国境外,因此往返谷歌的所有流量必须至少经过中国的一个国际网关 ISP 。因此,谷歌的访问问题只能通过在中国境内建立本地业务来解决。

Operating without a local presence, Google’s slowness and unreliability appears to have been a major – perhaps the major – factor behind our steadily declining market share. According to third-party estimates, Baidu has gone from 2.5% of the search market in 2003 to 46% in 2005, while Google has dropped to below 30% (and falling).9 The statistics are even more dire among the college-age young, who use Baidu even more, and Google less, than their elders. Part of this has been due to improvements in Baidu’s services and a major marketing campaign (funded by the proceeds of its successful IPO in the US), but the leading cause seems to be the Chinese users’ annoyance at the persistent slowness and unreliability of Google.

在没有本地业务的情况下,谷歌的缓慢和不可靠似乎是我们市场份额稳步下降背后的一个主要因素 – 或许是主要因素。根据第三方的估计,百度从 2003 年的搜索市场的 2.5 % 上升到 2005 年的 46 % ,而谷歌已经下降到 30 % 以下(并且还在下降)。处于大学阶段的年轻人中,统计数据更加可怕,他们比他们的长辈使用百度更多,而谷歌更少。部分原因在于百度服务的改善和一项重大的营销活动(由其在美国成功上市的收益提供资金),但主要原因似乎是中国用户对谷歌的持续缓慢和不可靠感到恼火。

Google’s Calibrated Approach

In light of the chronic access problems that have plagued Google in China, Google’s management set out more than a year ago to study and learn about China, to understand and assess our options, to debate their relative merits, and to make a decision that properly weighs both business and ethical considerations.



There is no question that, as a matter of business, we want to be active in China. It is a huge, rapidly growing, and enormously important market, and our key competitors are already there. It would be disingenuous to say that we don’t care about that because, of course, we do. We are a business with stockholders, and we want to prosper and grow in a highly competitive world.


At the same time, acting ethically is a core value for our company, and an integral part of our business culture. Our slowness and unreliability has meant that Google is failing in its mission to make the world’s information accessible and useful to Chinese Internet users. Only a local presence would allow Google to resolve most, if not all, of the latency and access issues. But to have a local presence in China would require Google to get an Internet Content Provider license, triggering a set of regulatory requirements to filter and remove links to content that is considered illegal in China.

同时,合乎道德是我们公司的核心价值观,也是我们商业文化不可或缺的一部分。我们的缓慢和不可靠意味着谷歌的使命是让( “ 谷歌的使命是让 ” 可理解为 “ 谷歌需要让 ” )世界信息对中国互联网用户开放和有用。只有本地存在才允许谷歌解决大部分(而不是全部)延迟和访问问题。但要在中国本土立足,谷歌需要获得互联网内容提供商许可证,从而引发一系列监管要求,以过滤和删除在中国被视为非法内容的链接。

So we were confronted with two basic options – [1] stay out of China, or [2] establish a local presence in China – either of which would entail some degree of inconsistency with our corporate mission. In assessing these options, we looked at three fundamental Google commitments:

(a) Satisfy the interests of users,
(b) Expand access to information, and
(c) Be responsive to local conditions.


(a) 满足用户的诉求
(b) 扩大获取信息的途径,以及
(c) 因地制宜

The strongest argument for staying out of China is simply that Google should not cross the line of self-censorship, and should not be actively complicit in imposing any limits on access to information. To be clear, the persistence of severe access problems amid fierce competition from local alternatives suggests that the consequence of this approach would be the steady shrinking of Google’s market share ever closer to zero. Without meaningful access to Google, Chinese users would rely exclusively on Internet search engines that may lack Google’s fundamental commitment to maximizing access to information – and, of course, miss out on the many features, capabilities, and tools that only Google provides.

离开中国的最有力的理由就是谷歌不应该跨越自我审查的界限,不应该积极参与对信息获取的任何限制。需要明确的是,在来自当地替代品的激烈竞争中,由持续存在的严重的访问问题表明,这种方法的结果将使谷歌的市场份额稳步缩小至接近于零。如果无法有意义地访问 Google ,中国用户将完全依赖(本土的)互联网搜索引擎,这些搜索引擎可能缺乏像谷歌一样的最大限度地获取信息的基本承诺 – 当然,也会错过只有谷歌提供的许多特性、功能和工具。

On the other hand, we believe that even within the local legal and regulatory constraints that exist in China, a speedy, reliable Google.cn service will increase overall access to information for Chinese Internet users. We noted, for example, that the vast majority of Internet searches in China are for local Chinese content, such as local news, local businesses, weather, games and entertainment, travel information, blogs, and so forth. Even for political discussions, Chinese users are much more interested in local Chinese Internet sites and sources than from abroad. Indeed, for Google web search, we estimate that fewer than 2% of all search queries in China would result in pages from which search results would be unavailable due to filtering.

另一方面,我们相信即使在中国现有的当地法律和监管限制范围内,一个快速、可靠的 Google.cn 服务也将增加中国互联网用户的整体信息访问。例如,我们注意到,中国绝大多数互联网搜索都是针对本地中文内容,例如本地新闻、本地商家、天气、游戏和娱乐、旅游信息、博客等。即使是进行政治讨论,中国用户对中国本土互联网站点和消息来源的兴趣也远远超过国外(的站点和消息来源)。实际上,对于谷歌网络搜索,我们估计中国不到 2 % 的搜索查询会由于过滤而无法获得搜索结果。

Crucial to this analysis is the fact that our new Google.cn website is an additional service, not a replacement for Google.com in China. The Chinese-language Google.com will remain open, unfiltered and available to all Internet users worldwide.

这一分析的关键在于,我们新的 Google.cn 网站是一项附加服务,而不是 Google.com 在中国的替代品。中文 Google.com 将保持开放、未经过滤和可供全球所有互联网用户使用。

At the same time, the speed and technical excellence of Google.cn means that more information will be more easily searchable than ever before. Even with content restrictions, a fast and reliable Google.cn is more likely to expand Chinese users’ access to information.

与此同时,Google.cn 的速度和技术优势意味着更多的信息将比以往更容易搜索。即使有内容限制,快速可靠的 Google.cn 也更有可能扩大中国用户对信息的访问。

We also took steps that went beyond a simple mathematical calculus about expanding access to information. First, we recognize that users are also interested in transparency and honesty when information has been withheld. Second, users are concerned about the privacy, security, and confidentiality of their personal information. Finally, users want to have competition and choices, so that the market players have a strong incentive to improve their offerings over time.

我们还采取了超越简单数学微积分( “ 微积分 ” 可理解为 “ 计算 ” 或 “ 分析 ” )的步骤来扩大对信息的访问。首先,我们认识到,当信息被截留时,用户也对透明度和诚实( “ 诚实 ” 可理解为 “ 事实真相 ” )感兴趣。第二,用户关心他们个人信息的隐私、安全和保密性。最后,用户希望有竞争和选择,以便市场参与者有强烈的动机随着时间的推移改进他们的产品。

Transparency. Users have an interest in knowing when potentially relevant information has been removed from their search results. Google’s experience dealing with content restrictions in other countries provided some crucial insight as to how we might operate Google.cn in a way that would give modest but unprecedented disclosure to Chinese Internet users.

透明度。用户希望知道何时从搜索结果中删除了可能相关的信息。谷歌处理其他国家内容限制的经验为我们如何运营 Google.cn 提供了一些重要的参考,这种方式可以为中国互联网用户提供适度但前所未有的披露。

Google has developed a consistent global policy and technical mechanism for handling content deemed illegal by a host government. Several of the countries in which we operate have laws that regulate content.In all of these countries, Google responds similarly. First, when we get a court order or legal notice in a foreign country where we operate, we remove the illegal content only from the relevant national version of the Google search engine (such as Google.fr for France). Second, we provide a clear notice to users on every search results page from which one or more links has been removed. The disclosure allows users to hold their legal systems accountable.

谷歌已经制定了一套统一的全球政策和技术机制来处理被东道国政府视为非法的内容。我们经营的几个国家都有法律对内容进行监管。在所有这些国家里,谷歌的回应都是类似的。首先,当我们在我们经营的外国获得法院命令或法律通知时,我们只从谷歌搜索引擎的相关国家版本(如法国的 Google.fr )中删除非法内容。第二,我们在每个搜索结果页面上向用户提供一个明确的通知,其中一个或多个链接已被删除。该公开将使用户对其法律制度负责。

This response allows Google to be respectful of local content restrictions while providing meaningful disclosure to users and strictly limiting the impact to the relevant Google website for that country. For China, this model provided some useful guidance for how we could handle content restrictions on Google.cn in way that would afford some disclosure when links have been removed.

这种回应使谷歌在向用户提供有意义的信息披露的同时,尊重当地的内容限制,并严格限制对该国相关谷歌网站的影响。对于中国来说,这个模型为我们如何处理 Google.cn 上的内容限制提供了一些有用的指导,当链接被删除时,这样做可以提供一些信息披露。

Privacy and Security. Google is committed to protecting consumer privacy and confidentiality. Prior to the launch of Google.cn, Google conducted intensive reviews of each of our services to assess the implications of offering it directly in China. We are always conscious of the fact that data may be subject to the jurisdiction of the country where it is physically stored. With that in mind, we concluded that, at least initially, only a handful of search engine services would be hosted in China.

隐私和安全。Google 致力于保护消费者的隐私权和机密性。在推出 Google.cn 之前,我们对 Google 的每项服务进行了深入审核,以评估直接在中国提供服务时的影响。我们始终意识到数据可能受其物理存储所在地的管辖。考虑到这一点,我们得出结论,至少在最初,只有少数搜索引擎服务将在中国托管。

We will not store data somewhere unless we are confident that we can meet our expectations for the privacy and security of users’ sensitive information. As a practical matter, meeting this user interest means that we have no plans to host Gmail, Blogger, and a range of other such services in China.

我们不会将数据存储在某个地方,除非我们确信我们能够满足对用户敏感信息的隐私和安全性的期望。实际上,为了满足用户的这些诉求意味着我们没有计划在中国托管 Gmail 、Blogger 和一系列其他此类服务。

Competition and Choice. Internet users in China, like people everywhere, want competition and choices in the marketplace. Without competition, companies have little incentive to improve their services, advance the state of the art, or take innovative risks. If Google were to stay out of China, it would remove powerful pressure on the local players in the search engine market to create ever-more-powerful tools for accessing and organizing information. Google’s withdrawal from China would cede the terrain to the local Internet portals that may not have the same commitment, or feel the competitive pressure, to innovate in the interests of their users.


The Decision: What Google Is Doing in China

The deliberative process and analysis outlined above led to the following decisions.



(1) Launch Google.cn.

We have recently launched Google.cn, a version of Google’s search engine that we will filter in response to Chinese laws and regulations on illegal content. This website will supplement, and not replace, the existing, unfiltered Chinese-language interface on Google.com. That website will remain open and unfiltered for Chinese-speaking users worldwide.

( 1 )启动 Google.cn 。

我们最近推出了 Google.cn ,这是谷歌搜索引擎的一个版本,我们将根据中国有关非法内容的法律法规进行过滤。本网站将补充而非取代 Google.com 上现有的未经过滤的中文入口。对于全球华语用户而言,该网站将继续保持开放和未经过滤的状态。

(2) Disclosure of Filtering

Google.cn presents to users a clear notification whenever links have been removed from our search results in response to local laws and regulations in China. We view this a step toward greater transparency that no other company has done before.

( 2 )过滤披露

Google.cn 会根据中国当地的法律法规,在我们的搜索结果中删除链接时向用户显示明确的通知。我们认为这是迈向更高透明度的一步,这是其他公司以前没有做过的。

(3) Limit Services

Google.cn today includes basic Google search services, together with a local business information and map service. Other products – such as Gmail and Blogger, our blog service – that involve personal and confidential information will be introduced only when we are comfortable that we can provide them in a way that protects the privacy and security of users’ information.

( 3 )限制服务

今天的 Google.cn 包括基本的 Google 搜索服务,以及本地商业信息和地图服务。其他产品 – 例如 Gmail 和 Blogger ,我们的博客服务 – 涉及个人和机密信息,只有在我们能够以保护用户信息的隐私权和安全性的方式提供这些信息时才会引入。

Next Steps: Voluntary Industry Action

Google supports the idea of Internet industry action to define common principles to guide the practices of technology firms in countries that restrict access to information. Together with colleagues at other leading Internet companies, we are actively exploring the potential for guidelines that would apply for all countries in which Internet content is subjected to governmental restrictions. Such guidelines might encompass, for example, disclosure to users, protections for user data, and periodic reporting about governmental restrictions and the measures taken in response to them.



Next Steps: U.S. Government Action

The United States government has a role to play in contributing to the global expansion of free expression. For example, the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative should continue to make censorship a central element of our bilateral and multilateral agendas.



Moreover, the U.S. government should seek to bolster the global reach and impact of our Internet information industry by placing obstacles to its growth at the top of our trade agenda. At the risk of oversimplification, the U.S. should treat censorship as a barrier to trade, and raise that issue in appropriate fora.

此外,美国政府应将阻碍互联网信息产业增长的障碍放在贸易议程的首要位置,以期加强互联网信息产业的全球影响力。在冒着(把审查制度看得)过于简单的危险下(这句可理解为 “ 不应该把审查制度看得过于简单化 ” ),美国应将审查制度视为贸易壁垒,并在适当场合提出这一议题。


  1. “China Online Search Market Survey Report,” China Network Information Center (CNNIC) (August 2005) (“CNNIC Search Engine Study”).
  2. Guo Liang, “Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Five Chinese Cities,” Research Center for Social Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (November 2005) (“the CASS Internet Survey”), at iii. The CASS Internet Survey is a statistically rigorous survey of Internet users in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha.
  3. Id.
  4. Id., at iv.
  5. “15th Statistic Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” China Network Information Center (CNNIC) (2005).
  6. From statistics published by China’s Ministry of Information Industry.
  7. CASS Internet Survey., at iv-ix, 93-100.
  8. Id. at 100.
  9. CNNIC Search Engine Study.




  • https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html